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NOTES
The categorical statement that a crime is committed when
the offender performs his act is open to serious objection. Since
some crimes occur over an extended period of time, it is only
with extreme difficulty that the exact time of the commission of
the crime can be established. These situations simply do not lend
themselves to this type of factual analysis. Although this is true,
it is at the same time possible to determine the time of com-
pletion of such crimes. It is not until some prescribed criminal
consequences have been produced by an act that the crime is
complete. A crime is not the individual's act, nor the conse-
quences of his act. It is rather a combination of the two ele-
mentsY For a crime to exist, both must prevail; neither alone
will suffice. The very fact that the court rationalized in terms of
act plus consequences, instead of dealing with acts alone, indi-
cates its realization of this concept. In the present case the care-
less installation of pipe by the defendants was a necessary fac-
tor of criminal liability; but standing alone, it did not constitute
a crime.
It is respectfully submitted that this case calls for the plain
application of the ex post facto theory, and nothing more; it
was the time of the defendants' conduct alone that should have
received the attention of the court.
That the court recognized the basic purposes for the prohi-
bition against ex post facto statutes is evidenced by the ultimate
result. But the fact that the consequences of the defendants' acts
occurred after the effective date of Article 32 of the Louisiana
Criminal Code confused the issue so that although the court
decided correctly, it was drawn to tangents of irrelevancy which
could produce unintended results. They attempted to reconcile
the decision with a definition of when a crime was committed.
Fortunately, there was no compulsion to do so.
GENE W. LAFITTE
LABOR LAW - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INJUNCTION AGAINST
PEACEFUL PICKETING -Defendants, members of a labor union
composed in part of retail ice peddlers, sought to induce non-
union peddlers to join the union by obtaining from the whole-
sale ice distributors in Kansas City agreements not to sell ice
to non-union peddlers. When the plaintiff, Empire Storage and
Ice Company, refused to agree after all other distributors had
9. See the cases of Brockway v. State of Indiana, 192 Ind. 656 (1923)
and Alderson v. State of Indiana, 196 Ind. 22 (1925).
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entered into the proposed agreement, the union peacefully pick-
eted plaintiff's place of business. After its business was reduced
85%, plaintiff obtained an injunction against the picketing. The
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed1 on the ground that defen-
dants' conduct was unlawful because it was designed to compel
plaintiff to make an agreement in violation of the state anti-
trade restraint laws.2 Defendants appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, claiming that the injunction violated their right
of free speech. Held, the injunction did not violate the federal
constitutional guaranty of free speech because the picketing
was "carried on as an essential and inseparable part of a course
of conduct" in violation of a valid state law. Giboney v. Empire
Storage and Ice Company, 336 U.S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed.
649 (1949).
The identification of picketing and free speech, which occur-
red only. as recently as 1940,3 has resulted in much confusion and
uncertainty concerning the power of the states to regulate labor's
use of one of its most potent weapons. The United States Su-
preme Court elevated picketing to its present status of consti-
tutionally protected free speech when, in Thornhill v. Alabama4
and in Carlson v. California,5 it struck down broadly-drawn
statutes which placed blanket prohibitions on all picketing activi-
ties. Holding in the Thornhill case that "the dissemination of
information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be re-
1. Empire Storage and Ice Co. v. Giboney, 357 Mo. 671, 210 S.W.(2d)
55 (1948).
2. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) § 8301, 8305, 8308.
3. Some writers believe that the identification of picketing and free
speech occurred in 1936 because of certain dictum by Justice Brandeis in
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478, 57 S.Ct. 857, 862, 81
L.Ed. 1229, 1236 (1936). He said: "Clearly the means which the statute au-
thorizes-picketing and publicity-are not prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Members of a union might, without special statutory authori-
zation by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of
speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." But, as one critic points
out, this statement "has been sadly misconstrued by most American lawyers.
They read Brandeis as having said that picketing-at, least, peaceful picket-
ing-is freedom of speech entitled to the guaranties of the federal Consti-
tution. But a re-reading of this quotation will show that he did not say
that at all or even imply it. He said simply that unions may make known
the facts of a labor dispute, as a matter of free speech-a constitutional
right they naturally enjoy with all other Americans-without saying how
they may do this." Gregory, Labor and the Law (1946) 340.
It should also be pointed out that the decision in the Senn case simply
held that there was nothing so inherently bad about peaceful picketing that
would make it unconstitutional for a state to make it a lawful technique.
Such a holding was far removed from a holding that picketing is protected
by the Constitution.
4. 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).
5. 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104 (1940).
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garded as within the area of free discussion that is guaranteed
by the Constitution,' 6 the Court concluded that the statute in
question, in prohibiting all picketing, was unconstitutional since
it abridged the right of free speech. That it was not the intention
of the court to prohibit all state regulation of picketing is in-
dicated by Justice Frankfurter's statement that the statute in
question "leaves room for no exceptions based upon either the
number of persons engaged in a prescribed activity, the peace-
ful character of their demeanor, the nature of their dispute with
an employer, or the restrained character and accurateness of the
terminology used in notifying the public of the facts of the dis-
pute.' '7 However, the court indicated that permissible state regu-
lation would be very limited in scope because it would hence-
forth be necessary to apply the traditional "clear and present
danger" test to this new type of free speech before state inter-
ference could be justified. In the words of the court: "Abridge-
ment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where
the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances
affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by compe-
tition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.""
The decision in the Thornhill case caused many to believe
that the court was prepared to treat picketing as free speech
pure and simple." This belief grew stronger as the high point
in the protection of picketing as a form of free speech was
reached in American Federation of Labor v. Swing.10 There, the
court found that the constitutional guaranty of free speech had
been violated by an injunction against peaceful picketing issued
on the ground that the common law policy of the state forbade
picketing in the absence of the employer-employee relationship.
Said the court: "A state cannot exclude workingmen from
peacefully exercising the right of free communication by draw-
ing the circle of economic competition between employers and
workers so small as to contain only an employer and those di-
rectly employed by him."'"
Decided the same day as the Swing case, Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Incorporated12 indi-
6. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093,
1102 (1940).
7. 310 U.S. 88, 99, 60 S.Ct. 736, 743, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 1101.
8. 310 U.S. 88, 104, 60 S.Ct. 736, 745, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 1104.
9. Teller, Picketing and Free Speech (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 184.
10. 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855 (1941).
11. 312 U.S. 321, 326, 61 S.Ct. 568, 570, 85 L.Ed. 855, 857.
12. 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 836 (1941).
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cated that picketing was not simply a matter of free speech
after all and that the scope of the protection afforded picketing
activities by the constitutional guaranty of free speech might not
be so broad as had been indicated in the Thornhill decision. The
decision in the Meadowmoor case upheld the issuance of a
blanket injunction restraining peaceful picketing because of the
"background of violence" in which the picketing was set.
Then, in March, 1942, in Bakery & Pastry Drivers and Help-
ers Local 802 v. Wohl,13 the court refused to uphold the issuance of
an injunction by a New York court on the ground that the
"[state] courts were concerned only with the question whether
there was involved a labor dispute within the meaning of the
New York statutes and [the state courts] assumed that the legal-
ity of the injunction followed from a determination that such a
dispute was not involved. '14 This language shows that the federal
court misconstrued the decision of the New York tribunal. The
case involved picketing which was designed to induce individuals
who had no employees to hire union labor. Since New York had
an anti-injunction statute 15 (very similar to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act), "' the first issue for the New York court's decision was
whether the case fell under the provisions of that statute. Having
determined that it did not, the state court was then free to decide
the case according to the common law. This it did, basing its deci-
sion on the rule well-established in New York that picketing to
induce an individual without employees to hire union workers
is for an unlawful purpose and, therefore, enjoinable."1 Thus the
federal court erred in assuming that the issuance of the injunc-
tion by the state courts was based on nothing more than a find-
ing that a "labor dispute" was not involved. Actually, therefore,
the question before the court was whether N~w York might
constitutionally restrain peaceful picketing which it found to
be for an unlawful purpose under the common law as admin-
istered by its courts.'8 The court did not decide this question,
but there was certain language in the opinion which seemed to
intimate that the injunction would have been sustained had the
13. 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (1942).
14. 315 U.S. 769, 774, 62 S.Ct. 816, 818, 86 L.Ed. 1178, 1183.
15. New York Civil Practice Act, § 876-a (1935).
16. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1949).
17. Luft v. Flove, 270 N.Y. 640, 1 N.E.(2d) 369 (1936); Thompson v. Boek-
hout, 273 N.Y. 390, 7 N.E.(2d) 674 (1937).
18. In American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568,
85 L.Ed. 855 (1941), the court had based its decision on a finding that a
state's common law policy which prohibits stranger picketing is unconsti-
tutional.
court understood that the decision of the state court was based
upon a finding that the picketing was for an unlawful purpose. 9
In Carpenters & Joiners Union of America Local No. 213 v.
Ritter's Cafe, 20 decided the same day, Ritter, the cafe owner, had
contracted with an independent contractor for the construction
of a building which was to be located a mile and a half from
the cafe and which was to have no connection with the cafe
business. When the contractor hired non-union labor, the union
picketed the cafe. The Texas court enjoined the picketing on
the ground that it was in violation of the state anti-trust law.2 1
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no con-
stitutional guarantee was abridged by the decision of Texas "to
insulate from the dispute an establishment which industrially
has no connection with the dispute. '2 2 Justice Black dissented
(Justices Murphy and Douglas concurred in the dissent) claim-
ing that the injunction impaired the right of free speech.2 3 He
mentioned but failed to discuss the fact that the Texas court had
held the picketing to be for an unlawful purpose.
In the instant case it was pointed out that the states have
the power to prohibit combinations and agreements in restraint
of trade (of which the agreement not to sell to particular persons
is a well-recognized example) .24 Here, Missouri had made such
a prohibition in its anti-trade restraint law. Caught between this
statute and the union activities, Empire faced prosecution for
a felony, suits for triple damages if it agreed not to sell to non-
union men, or destruction of its business if it refused to enter
19. "The respondents say that the basis of the decision below was
revealed in a subsequent opinion of the Court of Appeals, where it was
said with regard to the present case that 'we held that it was an unlawful
labor objective to attempt to coerce a peddler employing no employees in
his business and making approximately thirty-two dollars a week, to hire
an employee at nine dollars a day for one day a week.' Opera on Tour v.
Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 357, 34 N.E.(2d) 349, 353, 136 A.L.R. 267, cert. denied
314 U.S. 615, 62 S.Ct. 96, 86 LEd. -. But this lacks the deliberateness and
formality of a certification." Bakery & Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local
802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 774, 62 S.Ct. 816, 818, 86 L.Ed. 1178, 1183 (1941).
See Teller, supra note 9, at 193.
Much of the apparent uncertainty among the state courts concerning
their power to issue injunctions where picketing is deemed to be for an
unlawful objective is traceable to this opinion. Note (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 701.
20. 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143 (1942).
21. Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe,
149 S.W.(2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
22. 315 U.S. 722, 727, 62 S.Ct. 807, 810, 86 L.Ed. 1143, 1147.
23. 315 U.S. 722, 729, 62 S.Ct. 807, 810, 86 L.Ed. 1143, 1148.
24. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 495, 69 S.Ct. 684,
687, 93 L.Ed. 649, 652 (1949); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed. 949 (1941).
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into the proposed agreement. When Empire sought an injunction,
neither the state court nor the United States Supreme Court had
any difficulty in disposing of the defendants' contention that
their right of free speech would be violated if the picketing were
to be enjoined. Said Justice Black for a unanimous court: "It
rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used
as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute. We reject the contention now. '25
The decision is an important one, and is undoubtedly correct.
Although the Giboney case is under the first of the picketing-free
speech cases in which the United States Supreme Court has
based its decision on the unlawfulness of purpose of the picket-
ing, the state courts have almost without exception upheld in-
junctions where the picketing sought to induce a violation of a
state statute.26 It is submitted that the decision does not extend
the area of permissible state regulation of picketing, but simply
reaffirms principles which had already been indicated in earlier
decisions. In other words, the decision serves only to define more
sharply the extent of the area of permissible state regulation
already roughly outlined by the court.
ELLIS C. MAGEE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREsT-On Feb-
ruary 1, 1943, a printer who was in possession of plates for
forging overprints on stamps was taken into custody. He dis-
closed that the defendant was one of the customers to whom he
sold and delivered the forged overprints. On February 6, 1943,
officers were sent to purchase from the defendant stamps bear-
ing overprints. These stamps were reported to be forgeries on
February 9, and on the 16th of the same month officers armed
with a warrant for the arrest of the defendant went to the de-
fendant's place of business, arrested him, and over his protest
conducted a search of his desk, safe, and file cabinet, the search
lasting approximately one and a half hours, during the course
of which a large number of stamps upon which overprints had
been forged were found. The second count of the indictment
charged the defendant with keeping in his possession 573 forged
stamps. At the trial the defendant made timely motion for the
25. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684,
688, 93 L.Ed. 649, 654 (1949).
26. Note (1949) 28 Ore. L. Rev. 391, 393, and the cases there cited.
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